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Abstract
Higher renewables penetration reduces the incentive of conventional electricity generators
to make forward commitments via forward- or retail-market contracts. This can undermine
the role of forward contracting in mitigating market power. More renewables raise whole-
sale electricity prices in states of the world where their capacity utilization is low due to
intermittency.
Keywords: Electricity markets, renewable energy, forward contracting.
1 Introduction
Renewables such as solar and wind already account for up to 30% of power generation in the UK,
Germany and parts of the US (Pollitt & Anaya 2015), and global decarbonization objectives will
require further large-scale investment. Due to their near-zero marginal costs, renewables come
with a well-known merit-order e¤ectby which they displace conventional electricity generators
(e.g., Green & Léautier 2015; Liski & Vehvilainen 2015).
The literature on wholesale electricity markets places signicant emphasis on how forward
contracting can mitigate market power (e.g., Wolak 2000; Ausubel & Cramton 2010). Such
forward commitments can take the form of forward contracting (Allaz & Vila 1993) or retail
market sales (Bushnell, Mansur & Saravia 2008).1 In practice, power generators indeed sell
forward a signicant fraction of production (Anderson, Hua & Winchester 2007).
This paper examines the equilibrium interaction between renewables competition and for-
ward contracting. The model generalizes Allaz & Vila (1993) to (i) incorporate the intermittent
My thanks are due to Anette Boom, David Newbery and EPRG colleagues for their comments. All views
and any errors are mine.
1This paper takes the same approach as this literature in that it examines the strategic incentive for forward
contracting rather than the hedging motive driven by risk aversion.
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nature of renewables production, and (ii) allow for n > 2 strategic players, with cost hetero-
geneity to represent di¤erent generation technologies (such as coal- or gas-red plant).
2 Model
Consider a wholesale electricity market with a set N = f1; 2; :::; ng of n  2 active incumbent
electricity generators. Renewables are installed with capacity R, with zero marginal operating
costs and zero carbon emissions.2
There are M  2 states of the world, reecting the intermittency of renewables production.
State m occurs with probability m 2 (0; 1) where
PM
k=1 k  1. In state m, the rate of capacity
utilization of renewables is m 2 (0; 1], ordered such that 1 > 2 > ::: > M . Firm i 2 N sells
xmi units with a marginal cost ci, so total conventional output Xm 
P
i2N x
m
i .
Electricity buyers form a linear demand curve p(Q) =   Q, where Q is consumption and
(; ) > 0. There is market clearing in each state of the world, so prices are state-contingent:
in state m, total output satises Qm = Xm + mR, and electricity trades at a price pm.
The timing of the game is as follows. In Stage 1, each incumbent chooses its forward
commitment yi, where the forward market is competitive with rational expectations. Then
the state of the world m is revealed. In Stage 2, each incumbent chooses its output x
m
i .
Incumbents each maximize their prots, while interacting strategically; renewables production
is non-strategic. The game is solved backwards for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.3
3 Results
The main question is, what is the equilibrium impact of more renewables capacity R? This
could arise because of an increase in renewables subsidies or due to technological progress which
reduces their investment costs.
First-order conditions
In Stage 2, the state of the world m is known. Firm is problem is to:
max
xmi
f(xmi   yi)pm   cixmi g
where yi is its forward commitment made in Stage 1, and demand pm =   (Xm + m). The
rm here only makes revenues on its uncommitted units (xmi   yi). The rst-order condition is:
0 = (pm   ci)  (xmi   yi) = [  (Xm + mR)  ci]  (xmi   yi). (1)
These n rst-order conditions dene incumbentsoptimal output choices as a function of con-
tracts. Let Y =(y1; y2; :::; yn) denote forward positions, leading to outputs xmi = xi(Y;m) for
2For simplicity, renewables are grouped into a single capacity gure.
3Firmschoices are assumed to be observable and there is no discounting.
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each i 2 N , and thus Xm = X(Y;m) and pm = p(Y;m) at the market-level for each state
m = 1; 2; :::;M .
In Stage 1, the state of the world is not yet known, so rm i maximizes its expected prots:
max
yi
Ei =
XM
k=1
k
n
(pk   ci)xki + (pf   pk)yi
o
.
The rst term reects its spot market prots and the second term represents its forward-market
prots at price pf . With a competitive forward market, the latter term is zero since the forward
price pf =
PM
k=1 kpk equals the expected spot price by the no-arbitrage condition.
Thus rm is problem boils down to:
max
yi
Ei =
XM
k=1
k [p(Y;k)  ci]xi(Y;k),
which makes explicit the dependencies on forward contract position arising in Stage 2. The
rst-order condition is:
0 =
XM
k=1
k

[p(Y;k)  ci]  xi(Y;k)

1 +
dX i(Y;k)
dxi

dxi(Y;k)
dyi
. (2)
This reects how rm is forward commitment yi a¤ects its subsequent production xmi , in each
of the M states of the world. It also incorporates the strategic e¤ect that changes in its own
production dxi have on the best-response outputs of its rivals dX i(Y;m) 
P
j2Nni dxi(Y;m).
The following result is useful in simplifying this condition:
Lemma 1. In state m, the incumbent rmsoutput responses in Stage 2 satisfy:
dX i(Y;m)
dxi
=  (n  1)
n
< 0 and
dxi(Y;m)
dyi
=
n
(n+ 1)
> 0.
Proof. Summing the Stage 2 rst-order conditions from (1) for all rms but rm i gives:
0 = (n  1) [  (X(Y;m) + mR)] 
X
j2Nni
cj   [X i(Y;m)  Y i].
Di¤erentiating this expression shows that dX i(Y;m)=dxi =  (n  1)=n < 0, as claimed, since
n  2. Rearranging the rst-order condition for rm i from (1) shows that
xi(Y;m) = yi +
(  ci)

  [X(Y;m) + mR] =)
dxi(Y;m)
dyi
= 1  dX(Y;m)
dyi
.
Summing (1) over all n rms gives:
0 = n [  (X(Y;m) + mR)] 
X
i2N
ci   [X(Y;m)  Y ].
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Solving this for aggregate output gives:
X(Y;m) =
n(  mR) 
P
i2N ci + Y
(n+ 1)
=) dX(Y;m)
dyi
=
dX(Y;m)
dY
=
1
(n+ 1)
(3)
since Y  Pi2N yi, and so dY=dyi = 1. Using this expression in dxi(Y;m)=dyi = [1  
dX(Y;m)=dyi] conrms that dxi(Y;m)=dyi = n=(n+ 1) > 0, as claimed.
The rst part shows that competition in Stage 2 is in strategic substitutes: if rm i raises
its output, then it is optimal for its rivals to cut back. The second part is the pro-competitive
e¤ect of forward contracting identied by Allaz & Vila (1993); Lemma 1 shows that it survives
under the presence of renewables.
The key observation is that these responses are state-independent : they do not vary with
the capacity utilization of renewables generation m, which has an impact on the levels of prices
and quantities, but not on the strength of rmsstrategic responses at the margin.4
Equilibrium
The equilibrium is dened implicitly by the n  (M + 1) rst-order conditions for fxmi gni=1 in
each of M states plus fyigni=1. Label this equilibrium bxmi = xi( bY;m) and byi for each i 2 N ,
and thus bXm = X( bY;m), bY =Pi2N byi and bpm = p( bY;m).
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, rm i engages in forward contracting according to:
byi = (n  1)
n
XM
k=1
kbxki .
Proof. By (1), optimality in Stage 2 implies (bpm   ci) = (bxmi   byi), in equilibrium, for rm i,
and using this in the rst-order condition for Stage 1 from (2) gives:
0 = 
XM
k=1
k
(
[bxki   byi]  bxki
 
1 +
dX i
dxi

fbxki gni=1
!)
dxi
dyi

fbxki gni=1
= 
XM
k=1
k

[bxki   byi]  1nbxki

n
(n+ 1)
,
where the second line uses Lemma 1. Further rearranging gives:
0 =
XM
k=1
k

(n  1)
n
bxki   byi =) byi = (n  1)n XMk=1 kbxki ,
as claimed, since
PM
k=1 k  1.
Each rm would like to sell forward a fraction (n   1)=n of its subsequent output in each
state, which exceeds 50% but falls short of complete contracting (Allaz & Vila, 1993). However,
because of uncertainty about renewables intermittency during forward contracting, its optimal
strategy here is to sell forward this fraction of its expected output.
4This is a feature of the linear-quadratic setup of the model.
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This degree of forward contracting is broadly in line with real-world practice: contract cover
has ranged from 73 to 95% across the UK, New Zealand, and various US electricity markets
(Anderson, Hua & Winchester 2007).
Lemma 3. The equilibrium output choices for each state m and the equilibrium forward con-
tracting position of rm i are given by:
byi = (n  1)


(  ci)  n
2
(n2 + 1)
(  c)

  (n  1)
(n2 + 1)
R
XM
k=1
kk
bxmi = n

(  ci)  n
2
(n2 + 1)
(  c)

  R
(n+ 1)

m +
(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

,
where c  1n
P
i2N ci is the (unweighted) average unit cost of rms.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that rm is output bxmi in state m depends individually on the renewable load factor
m, while its forward position byi can depend only on the average PMk=1 kk. Firm i is indeed
active, as assumed, in state m as long as bpm > ci () bxmi > byi; its cost disadvantage cannot
be too pronounced, (  ci) >

n2=(n2 + 1)

(  c). A su¢ cient condition for all n rms to be
active in all M states is that:
R <
(n+ 1)


( maxifcigni=1) 
n2
(n2 + 1)
(  c)


1  n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk
  R.
Lemma 3 leads to the following main results:
Proposition 1. More renewables competition:
(i) reduces the equilibrium volume of forward contracting by rm i, dbyi=dR < 0;
(ii) leads to the equilibrium displacement of rm is production in each state m, dbxmi =dR < 0.
Proof. Follows by inspection of Lemma 3.
Proposition 1 identies the forward-contracting e¤ect of renewables competition. More re-
newables displace incumbent producers according to the well-known merit-order e¤ect. However,
this makes the market less attractive to incumbent producers, which reduces their incentive to
make forward commitments.
Renewables thus directly raise the intensity of competition in the wholesale market but they
indirectly reduce the intensity of rivalry amongst incumbents.
Proposition 2. (i) More renewables competition raises the equilibrium price in state m if and
only if the forward-contracting e¤ect outweighs the merit-order e¤ect; this holds in all states of
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the world for which renewablescapacity utilization is su¢ ciently low:
dbpm
dR
=   
(n+ 1)
 
m +
dbY
dR
!
> 0() m <
 
 d
bY
dR
!
() m <
n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk  ,
while the equilibrium price falls in all other states, with m  .
(ii) More renewables competition decreases the average equilibrium price as measured by the
forward price:
dbpf
dR
=   
(n+ 1)

1  n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk < 0.
Proof. For part (i), the price impact of more renewables, in general, is given by:
dbpm
dR
=
@bpm
@R
bY xed + dbpmdY

Y=bY
dbY
dR
. (4)
Since demand curve in state m, at equilibrium, is bpm =   [ bXm + mR], it follows that:
dbpm
dR
bY xed =  
 
d bXm
dR
bY xed + m
!
=   m
(n+ 1)
< 0,
and
@bpm
@Y

Y=bY =  
d bXm
dY

Y=bY =  

(n+ 1)
< 0
which both use (3), at equilibrium. Putting these results together in (4) yields:
dbpm
dR
=   
(n+ 1)
 
m +
dbY
dR
!
.
Using the result for dbyi=dR < 0 from Proposition 1 conrms that:
dbY
dR

X
i2N
dbyi
dR
=  n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk < 0, (5)
and the claims follow. For part (ii), the equilibrium forward price equals the expected market
price, and so: bpf =XM
k=1
kbpk =) dbpf
dR
=
XM
k=1
k
dbpk
dR
Using (5) gives:
dbpf
dR
=   
(n+ 1)

1  n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk < 0, (6)
which proves the result since the term in brackets is positive for all n  2.
Renewables can raise the electricity price. The merit-order e¤ect is always present but weaker
for states with lower m. The forward-contracting e¤ect is equally strong because commitments
are not state-contingent. So prices rise for lowm, and fall for highvalues of m.
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Specically, price rises if m < '
PM
k=1 kk by the fraction '  n(n  1)=(n2 + 1) 2 [25 ; 1).
With six incumbents, states with utilization below '  80% of the average experience higher
prices. In the binary case where renewables are either at capacity or inactive, the condition is
always met in the inactive state (for any n  2).
Large spreads in renewables capacity factors are borne out in practice (Borenstein 2012;
Pollitt & Anaya 2015). Averages for wind are typically  3040% while they are as low as 10%
for solar. Peak capacity factors for wind can be above 80% while utilization in Germany has
been as low as 5% on some days, with a zero contribution by solar.
4 Conclusion
Renewables competition can weaken the role of forward contracting in mitigating market power
in wholesale electricity markets and lead to higher prices in states of the world with strong
intermittency.
These results would be robust to demand uncertainty in form of state-contingent fkgMk=1.
Similar to renewables output in the above, this would not a¤ect strategic responses at the
margin, so the comparative statics still hold. Renewables competition R > R could induce exit
of higher-cost incumbents, altering the set of rms N . Exit raises prices across all states and
reduces the degree of forward contracting which would exacerbate the price-increasing e¤ect.
Increasing marginal costs would reduce the degree of forward contracting, relative to the
standard Allaz-Vila model with constant unit costs. This would likely dampen the above com-
parative statics but not overturn them. Risk-averse conventional generators also have a hedging
motive for forward contracting. In general, more renewables could increase or reduce their risk
exposure depending, e.g., on the correlation between renewables output fkgMk=1 and demand
fkgMk=1 across states. In any case, the above results apply as long as risk aversion is not too
pronounced.
The knock-on e¤ects of renewables penetration on competition via forward commitments may
deserve more attention from policymakers and analysts. These results should lend themselves
naturally to empirical and experimental testing. Future research could also pursue a welfare
analysis that incorporates the cost side of renewables investment as well as the social value of
the carbon emissions reductions achieved.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof begins by determining the market-level equilibrium quantities
for bXm and bY , and then turns to deriving to the rm-level analogs. From (3), in equilibrium:
bXm = n [(  c)  mR] +  bY
(n+ 1)
, (7)
where c  1n
P
i2N ci is the (unweighted) average unit cost of rms. Lemma 2 implies bY =
(n 1)
n
PM
k=1 k
bXk at the market-level; using (10) repeatedly in it gives:
bY = (n  1)
n
XM
k=1
k
n [(  c)  kR] +  bY
(n+ 1)
=
(n  1)
n(n+ 1)

n

(  c)  R
XM
k=1
kk

+  bY  , (8)
which uses
XM
k=1
k  1. Solving (8) for bY yields:
bY = n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)

(  c)  R
XM
k=1
kk

. (9)
Finally, using (9) in (7) and solving out gives:
bXm = n(  c)

1 +
(n  1)
(n2 + 1)

  nR

m +
(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

(n+ 1)
=
n
(n+ 1)

n(n+ 1)
(n2 + 1)
(  c)  R

m +
(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

. (10)
Now turning to the rm-level results, the Stage 2 rst-order condition (1) for rm i in state m
implies that, in equilibrium, bxmi = byi+(  ci)=  ( bXm+mR). Inserting (10) and rearranging
gives:
bxmi = byi + (  ci)   mR  n(n+ 1)

n(n+ 1)
(n2 + 1)
(  c)  R

m +
(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

= byi + 1


(  ci)  n
2
(n2 + 1)
(  c)

  R
(n+ 1)

m  
n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

. (11)
Recalling from Lemma 2 that byi = (n 1)n PMk=1 kbxki , and using (11) in it repeatedly gives:
byi = (n  1)
n
byi + 1


(  ci)  n
2
(n2 + 1)
(  c)

  R
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

=) byi = (n  1) 1


(  ci)  n
2
(n2 + 1)
(  c)

  R
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

. (12)
Finally, using (12) in (11) and solving yields the formula for bxmi , as claimed.
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